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Abstract. Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection.
Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should
therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through
the formation of homogeneous clusters, which is the hallmark of network reciprocity.
Here we go beyond this traditional setup and study the spatiotemporal dynamics of
cooperation in a population of populations. We use the prisoner’s dilemma game as the
mathematical model and show that considering several populations simultaneously give
rise to fascinating spatiotemporal dynamics and pattern formation. Even the simplest
assumption that strategies between different populations are payoff-neutral with one
another results in the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, where defectors
of one population become prey of cooperators in the other population, and vice
versa. Moreover, if social interactions within different populations are characterized by
significantly different temptations to defect, we observe that defectors in the population
with the largest temptation counterintuitively vanish the fastest, while cooperators
that hang on eventually take over the whole available space. Our results reveal that
considering the simultaneous presence of different populations significantly expands
the complexity of evolutionary dynamics in structured populations, and it allow us to
understand the stability of cooperation under adverse conditions that could never be
bridged by network reciprocity alone.
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1. Introduction
Methods of statistical physics, in particular Monte Carlo simulations and the theory of
phase transitions [1, 2, 3], have been successfully applied to a rich plethora of challenging
problems in the social sciences [4, 5, 6, 7]. The evolution of cooperation in social
dilemmas — situations where what is best for the society is at odds with what is best for
an individual — is a vibrant example of this development. Many reviews [8, 9, 10, 11]
and research papers that reveal key mechanisms for socially preferable evolutionary
outcomes have been published in recent years [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26]. Since cooperative behaviour is central to the survival of many animal
species, and since it is also at the heart of the remarkable evolutionary success story of
humans [27, 28], it is one of the great challenges of the 21st century that we succeed in
understanding how best to sustain and promote cooperation [29].
It has been shown that phase transitions leading to cooperation depend sensitively
on the structure of the interaction network and the type of interactions [30, 31, 32,
33, 34], as well as on the number and type of competing strategies [8, 35, 36, 37].
An important impetus for the application of statistical physics to evolutionary social
dilemmas and cooperation has been the seminal discovery of Nowak and May [38],
who showed that spatial structure can promote the evolution of cooperation through
the mechanism that is now widely referred to as network reciprocity [39, 40]. A good
decade latter Santos and Pacheco have shown just how important the structure of the
interaction network can be [13], which paved the way further towards a flourishing
development of this field of research.
But while research concerning the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in
structured populations has come a long way, models where different populations do
not interact directly but compete for space at the level of individuals have not been
considered before. Motivated by this, we consider a system where two or more
populations are distributed randomly on a common physical space. Between the
members of a particular population the interactions are described by the prisoner’s
dilemma game. But there are no such interactions between players belonging to different
populations, and hence players are unable to collect payoffs from neighbors belonging
to a different population. The populations on the same physics space, for example on a
square lattice, are thus neutral. Nevertheless, all players compete for space regardless
to which population they belong, so that a player with a higher fitness is likely to invade
a neighboring player with a lower fitness.
As we will show, such a conglomerate of otherwise neutral populations gives rise
to fascinating spatiotemporal dynamics and pattern formation that is rooted in the
spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance. Within a very simple model, we observe the
survival of cooperators under extremely adverse conditions where traditional network
reciprocity would long fail, and we observe the dominance of the weakest due to the
greediness of the strongest when considering different temptations to defect in different
populations.
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In what follows, we first present the studied prisoner’s dilemma game and the details
of the mathematical model. We then proceed with the presentation of the main results
and a discussions of their wider implications.
2. Prisoner’s dilemma in neutral populations
As the backbone of our mathematical model, we use a simplified version of the prisoner’s
dilemma game, where the key aspects of this social dilemma are preserved while its
strength is determined by a single parameter [38]. In particular, mutual cooperation
yields the reward R = 1, mutual defection leads to punishment P = 0, while the
mixed choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S = 0 and the defector the
temptation T > 1. We note that the selection of this widely used and representative
parameterisation gives results that remain valid in a broad range of pairwise social
dilemmas, including the snowdrift and the stag-hunt game.
All players occupy the nodes of a L×L square lattice with four neighbours each. To
introduce the simultaneous presence of different populations, the L2 players are assigned
to i = 1, 2, . . . , n different populations uniformly at random. All i populations contain an
equal fraction of Ci cooperators andDi defectors, who upon pairwise interactions receive
payoffs in agreement with the above-described prisoner’s dilemma game. Importantly,
between different populations players are payoff-neutral with one another, which means
that when Ci meets Cj or Dj, its payoff does not change, and vice versa. In the next
subsection, we first consider the model where all populations have the same temptation
to defect (Ti = T for all i), and then we relax this condition to allow different temptations
to defect in different populations.
We use the Monte Carlo simulation method to determine the spatiotemporal
dynamics of the mathematical model, which comprises the following elementary steps.
First, a randomly selected player x acquires its payoff Πx by playing the game potentially
with all its four neighbours. Next, player x randomly chooses one neighbour y, who then
also acquires its payoff Πy in the same way as previously player x. Finally, player x
imitates the strategy of player y with the probability w = {1 + exp((Πx − Πy)/K)}
−1,
where we use K = 0.1 as the inverse of the temperature of selection to obtain results
comparable with existing research [8]. Naturally, when neighbouring players compete
for space then the above describe microscopic dynamics involves not only the adoption
of more successful strategy but also the imitation of the involved population tag.
In agreement with the random sequential simulation procedure, during a full Monte
Carlo step (MCS) each player obtains a chance once on average to imitate a neighbor.
The average fractions of all microscopic states on the square lattice are determined in
the stationary state after a sufficiently long relaxation time. Depending on the proximity
to phase transition points and the typical size of emerging spatial patterns, the linear
system size was varied from L = 400 to 6600, and the relaxation time was varied from
104 to 106 MCS to ensure that the statistical error is comparable with the size of the
symbols in the figures.
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Figure 1. The stationary fC fraction of cooperators in the whole system in dependence
on the temptation to defect T , as obtained for different numbers of populations n that
form the global ssystem (indicated by the number along each curve). For reference the
result of the classic one-population (n = 1) spatial prisoner’s dilemma game is shown
as well. These results indicate that the introduction of additional populations whose
members are payoff-neutral between one another significantly improves the survival
chances of cooperators.
3. Results
Naively, one might assume that introducing several populations simultaneously which
bear the same serious conflict of competing strategies might not bring about any changes
in the evolutionary outcome. As is well known, the Nash equilibrium of the prisoner’s
dilemma game is mutual defection [41], and since this applies to all populations, the
overall outcome should be mutual defection too. This reasoning is actually completely
correct in well-mixed populations, where the consideration of different, otherwise neutral
populations really does not change the result: cooperators die out in all populations as
soon as T > 1. But as we will show next, this naive expectation is completely wrong in
structured populations, where excitingly different evolutionary outcomes can be observe
due to the simultaneous presence of different populations.
As far as cooperation promotion is concerned, and before elucidating the responsible
microscopic mechanism for such favourable evolutionary outcomes, we show in Fig. 1
how the fraction of cooperators changes in dependence on the temptation to defect T
for different numbers of populations n that form the global system. For comparison,
we also show the baseline n = 1 case, which corresponds to the traditional version of
the weak prisoner’s dilemma game on the square lattice, and where cooperators benefit
from network reciprocity to survive up to T ≤ 1.037 [43]. It can be observed that, as
we increase n, the fraction of cooperators increases dramatically. In fact, the higher the
value of n, the higher the stationary fraction of cooperators in the whole system.
The spatiotemporal dynamics behind this promotion of cooperation in a complex
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Figure 2. Snapshot of the distribution of strategies in the stationary state in a system
consisting of two populations. In both population the temptation to defect is T = 1.2.
Defectors belonging to the first population are depicted dark red, while cooperators
of the first population are depicted dark blue. Similarly, cooperators and defectors
of the second population are depicted light blue and light red, respectively. The key
mechanism that is responsible for the emerging spatial pattern is highlighted by a white
circle marked ‘I’. Together with the animation provided in [42], it can be observed that
dark red defectors invade dark blue cooperators, but light blue cooperators invade
dark red defectors. Likewise, light red defectors invade light blue cooperators, but
dark blue cooperators invade light red defectors. This spontaneous emergence of cyclic
dominance in the form D1 → C1 → D2 → C2 → D1 is responsible for the sustenance
of cooperation even at very high temptation values that can be observed in Fig. 1.
The white ellipse marked ‘II’ highlights the smooth interface between both cooperator
strategies in the absence of defectors, which is surprising given that the two strategies
are payoff-neutral and thus should be subject to voter-model-like coarsening. For
clarity a L = 400 linear system size was used.
system consisting of two populations can be seen in the animation provided in [42],
while a representative snapshot of the stationary state is shown in Fig. 2. In both cases
cooperators are depicted blue while defectors are depicted red, and different shades
of these two colours denote adherence to the two different populations. In Fig. 2,
we have circled two crucial details that explain how the patterns evolve over time.
The white circle marked ‘I’ highlights that dark red defectors can easily invade dark
blue cooperators. However, the invaded space is quickly lost to light blue cooperators
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Figure 3. Snapshot of the distribution of strategies in the stationary state in a system
consisting of three populations. In all three population the temptation to defect is
T = 1.2. As in Fig. 2, different shades of blue and red depict cooperators and defector
belonging to different populations. White ellipses highlight that plain red defectors
are successfully invaded by both light blue and dark blue cooperators that belong to
the other two populations.
belonging to the other population. The latter, on the other hand, are successfully
invaded by light red defectors from their own population, who are in turn again invaded
by dark blue cooperators. In this way the loop is closed, revealing the spontaneous
emergence of cyclic dominance in the form D1 → C1 → D2 → C2 → D1, which
determines the stationary distribution of strategies in our system. As is well-known, the
cyclic dominance is crucial for the maintenance of biodiversity [36], which in our case
translates to the survival of all four competing strategies, and thus to the sustenance of
cooperation even at very high temptation values.
This cyclic dominance can be observed directly if we launch the evolution from a
prepared initial state, such that homogeneous domains of the competing strategies are
separated by straight interfaces, as in the animation provided in [44] (in this animation
a higher T = 1.5 temptation to defect was used to yield clearer propagating fronts). It
can be observed that conceptually similar propagating fronts emerge as were observed
before in rock-paper-scissors-like systems [36].
Turning back to Fig. 2, the white ellipse marked ‘II’ highlights another important
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aspect of the spatiotemporal dynamics, namely the smooth interface separating the two
cooperative strategies in the absence of defectors. This may be surprising at first because
these strategies are payoff-neutral, and thus a voter-model-like coarsening with highly
fluctuating interfaces would be expected [45]. Indeed, while a C1 cooperator does not
benefit from the vicinity of a C2 cooperator, other C1 cooperators close by of course
increase each other’s payoffs (and vice versa for C2 cooperators). As a consequence of
this the payoffs of C1 and C2 cooperators along the interface differ, so that one will likely
invade the other. This process always aims to straighten the interfaces. If an interface
cannot be straightened, for example around a small island, the latter will shrink due to
an effective surface tension.
Lastly in terms of the results presented in Fig. 1, it remains to explain why the larger
the number of populations forming the global system the higher the level of cooperation
in the stationary state, and this regardless of the temptation to defect. To that effect
we provide in [46] an animation showing the spatiotemporal dynamics when n = 3, and
in Fig. 3 a representative snapshot of the distribution of strategies on the square lattice
in the stationary state. These results reveal that the increasing positive effect is due to
the fact that the addition of one new population i always yields one additional prey to
the cooperators in other populations. At the same time, no new predators to them are
introduced, i.e., Di defectors who act as the prey to cooperators in the other populations
are predators only to Ci cooperators, but the latter find their prey in defectors from
other populations too. The snapshot in Fig. 3 features two white ellipses, where it is
highlighted that the plain red D3 defectors are dominated by both C1 (dark blue) and
C2 (light blue) cooperators (see also the animation in [46]).
Thus far, we have only considered cases where the temptation to defect was the same
in all populations. By relaxing this restriction, the number of free parameters increases
significantly, yet it is still possible to determine general properties of the spatiotemporal
dynamics that governs the evolutionary outcomes in a presented system.
We begin by presenting results for the generalized two-population setup where
T1 6= T2. As we have shown above, the emergence of cyclic dynamics between the four
competing microscopic states in general dictates a stable coexistence. By increasing the
temptation to defect in one population practically increases the rate in the corresponding
D → C invasion. The consequences of this fact, based on the fundamental principles of
cyclic dominance [36], actually completely explain the evolutionary outcomes in Fig. 4.
The first potentially surprising observation is that increasing the temptation to defect
T2 between D2 defectors and C2 cooperators will not only lower the stationary fraction
of C2 and increase the stationary fraction of D2, but also elevate the fraction of C1
cooperators. This is because D2 defectors are prey to C1 cooperators, and it is well-
known that a species entailed in cyclic dominance is promoted not by weakening its
predator, but rather by making its prey stronger. This paradox is a frequently observed
trademark of systems that are governed by cyclic dominance [47]. However, despite the
described boost to the growth of C1 cooperators, the overall fraction of all cooperators
in the whole system decreases slightly as we increase T2 towards very large values, as
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Figure 4. The stationary fractions of the four competing strategies in dependence on
the temptation to defect T2, as obtained for n = 2. The temptation to defect for the
first population is T1 = 1.05. The inset shows the overall fraction of cooperators in
the system in the large T2 limit.
illustrated in the inset of Fig. 4.
For a better demonstration of the acceleration of the D2 → C2 invasion and the
resulting boost to C1 cooperators (dark blue), we provide an animation in [48], where an
extreme high T2 = 100 was used at L = 400 linear system size. As the animation shows,
although C2 cooperators (light blue) are invaded very efficiently by D2 defectors (light
red), the abundance of D1 defectors (dark red) always offers an evolutionary escape
hatch out of extinction of C2 cooperators. In agreement with the above described cyclic
dominance, D2 defectors are fast invaded by C1 cooperators. Interestingly, D1 defectors
would also beat C1 cooperators because T1 = 1.05 is above the T = 1.037 cooperation
survival threshold of a single population, yet the D2 → C2 propagating front always
comes to the rescue, bringing with it D2 defectors as prey.
In comparison to the results obtained when the temptation to defect is the same
in all populations (see Fig. 1), it may come as a surprise that cooperators die out
if T > 2.85, and this despite the fact that qualitatively the same cyclic dominance
emerges there. The explanation of this difference illustrated in Fig. 4 is that in the
symmetrical case the D1 → C2 and D2 → C2 invasion rates change simultaneously as
we vary T . However, it is precisely this simultaneous change of invasion rates that may
jeopardize the stable coexistence in models of cyclic dominance. As shown previously
for a symmetric 4−strategy Lotka-Volterra system, the coexistence disappears if the
difference between the invasion rates exceeds a threshold value [49]. For an illustration,
the effective food-web of the four competing strategies in a two-population model is
shown in left panel of Fig. 5.
Naturally, if we allow different temptation values in different populations the
behaviour becomes even more complex, as we show next using still a relatively simple
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Figure 5. The effective food-web of all competing strategies in a two- (left) and three-
population (right panel) system. We emphasize that the depicted relations between
strategies exist only in a spatial system, where cooperators can invade defectors from
other populations. If we consider solely pairwise interactions, the relation between C1
cooperators and D2 defectors (or C1 and C2) is of course payoff-neutral, as defined in
the mathematical model.
three-population system as an example. The effective food-web is shown in the right
panel of Fig. 5. If we just vary T3, while the temptation to defect in the other
two populations remains fixed at T1 = T2 = 1.05, the D3 → C3 invasion rate will
influence invasions in several other cycles in the effective food-web. Examples include
the D3 → C3 → D1 → C1 → D3 cycle, or the D3 → C3 → D2 → C2 → D3 cycle, or
the D3 → C3 → D1 → C1 → D2 → C2 → D3 cycle, all of which contain the elementary
D3 → C3 invasion that is directly affected by T3. This is why it is almost impossible to
predict the response of a system comprised of several neutral populations, even if only
a single temptation to defect is varied.
For the above n = 3 case, the results showing how different T3 values affect the
evolutionary outcome are presented in Fig. 6. It can be observed that upon increasing
the value of T3, the stationary fraction of C1 and C2 cooperators is not affected, even
though they are the predators of D3 who should in principle be promoted by large T3
values. On the other hand, the overall fraction of all defectors in the system remains
very low. But the most exotic reaction is that of the fraction of C3 cooperators, which is
of course the direct prey of D3 defectors. While initially their fraction in the stationary
state decreases to a shallow minimum across the intermediate range of T3 values, it
ultimately increases to complete dominance above a threshold value. In other words,
while defectors survive when all T values in the system are equal to 1.05, they die out
if we increase one of them sufficiently, as it happens in Fig. 6 when the T3 value is
sufficiently large. Due to the symmetry of the model the same results are of course
obtained if either the value of T1 or T2 would be enlarged instead of the value of T3.
To better understand and illustrate the seemingly paradoxical effect the increasing
T3 value has on the evolutionary outcome, we provide an animation from a prepared
initial state in [50]. Here the square lattice is horizontally divided into two parts, where
in the top half C1 cooperators (dark blue) are framed by D1 defectors (dark red), while
in the bottom half C3 cooperators (plane blue) are framed by D3 defectors (plain red).
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Figure 6. The stationary fractions of the six competing strategies in dependence on
the temptation to defect T3, as obtained for n = 3. The temptation to defect for the
first and second population is T1 = T2 = 1.05. The inset shows the fraction of D3
defectors in dependence on T3. Counterintuitively, although larger T3 values directly
support D3 → C3 invasions, the fraction of D3 defectors decreases steadily as the value
of T3 increases.
Moreover, both D−C −D patches are surrounded by C2 cooperators (light blue). The
applied temptation to defect values are T1 = T2 = 1.05 and T3 = 1.8. Importantly,
invasions through the horizontal border are not permitted because we want to compare
the independent evolution of both sub-systems. Since D2 defectors are not present,
C2 cooperators have no natural predator. As a consequence, the whole system will
evolve into a pure C2 (light blue) phase. However, the really interesting aspect of
this animation is how the mentioned sub-systems reach this state. In the top half,
D1 defectors are less aggressive, and therefore their invasions are less salient. This
has two important consequences. In the first place, their payoffs are not that high for
the other strategies to imitate them, and so the C1 − D1 border is fluctuating rather
strongly. Secondly, D1 defectors do not form a homogeneous front along this border.
The latter would be essential for a fast invasion of C2 cooperators (light blue), who
are their predators. In other words, the effective invasion of C2 cooperators can only
happen via the invasion of D1 defectors. The latter conditions is completely fulfilled in
the bottom half where D3 defectors are more aggressive. Here defectors form not just
a more compact invasion front, but they also form a thick, uniform stripe, which is an
easy target for C2 cooperators. Consequently, the more aggressive defectors will die out
much faster than their less potent D1 counterparts in the top half of the square lattice.
This process just described is actually very common when the value of the
temptation to defect in one population is significantly larger than the corresponding
values in other populations. Of course, the extinction of the most aggressive defector
frequently involves also the extinction of its cooperator prey. Sometimes, however, if
the system size is large enough, it may happen that the prey of the more aggressive
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Figure 7. Snapshot of the distribution of strategies during an early stage of evolution
in a system consisting of three populations. Values of the temptation to defect are
T3 = 1.8 and T1 = T2 = 1.05. As in Figs. 2 and 3, different shades of blue and
red depict cooperators and defector belonging to different populations. White ellipses
highlight the weakest C3 cooperators (plane blue), who manage to survive despite the
large T3 value giving a huge evolutionary advantage to their direct predators D3 (plain
red). What is more, due to their greediness, D3 defectors are actually the first to die
out, thus paving the way for C3 cooperators to rise to complete dominance by using
D1 and D2 defectors (light and dark red) as a Trojan horse to invade the territory of
C1 and C2 cooperators (light and dark blue). This is an example where the weakest
ultimately dominate because of the greediness of the strongest. For clarity a L = 360
linear system size was used.
defectors manages to separate itself in an isolated part of the lattice and hang on until
his predators die out. Such a situation is illustrated in Fig. 7, where the white ellipses
and circles mark plain blue cooperator spots who got rid of their natural predators
(plain red). In the absence of the latter, the arguably weakest cooperators become the
strongest, and they eventually rise to complete dominance by invading defectors from
the other two populations who themselves continuously invade their cooperators. The
whole evolutionary process can be seen in the animation in [51], where we have used
prepared initial patches of the six competing strategies to make the spatiotemporal
dynamics that leads to the described pattern formation better visible. Additionally, for
a faster evolution, we have used a smaller L = 180 linear system size. In effect, the plain
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blue cooperators use the defectors from the other two populations as a Trojan horse to
invade the whole available space. And despite of starting as the weakest, they turn out
to be the dominant due to the greediness of their direct predators.
4. Discussion
We have studied the spatiotemporal dynamics of cooperation in a system where several
neutral populations are simultaneously present. The evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
game has been used as the backbone of our mathematical model, where we have assumed
that strategies between the populations are payoff-neutral but competing freely with
one another as determined by the interaction graph topology. Within a particular
population the classical definition of the prisoner’s dilemma game between cooperators
and defectors has been applied. We have observed fascinating spatiotemporal dynamics
and pattern formation that is unattainable in a single population setup. From the
spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance to the survival of the weakest due to the
greediness of the strongest, our results have revealed that the simultaneous presence
of neutral populations significantly expands the complexity of evolutionary dynamics
in structured populations. From the practical point of view, cooperation in the
proposed setup is strongly promoted and remains viable even under extremely adverse
conditions that could never be bridged by network reciprocity alone. The consideration
of simultaneously present neutral populations thus allows us to understand the extreme
persistence and stability of cooperation without invoking strategic complexity, and
indeed in the simplest possible terms as far as population structure and overall
complexity of the mathematical model is concerned.
The central observation behind the promotion of cooperation is that, if we put two
payoff-neutral populations together, then only cooperators can benefit from it in the
long run. While the advantage of mutual cooperation is readily recognizable already in
a single population, and it is in fact the main driving force behind traditional network
reciprocity, the extend of it remains limited because cooperators at the frontier with
defectors always remain vulnerable to invasion. This danger is here elegantly avoided
when a cooperative cluster meets with the defectors of the other population. In the
latter case the positive consequence of network reciprocity is augmented and cooperators
can easily invade the territory of the foreign defectors. Importantly, this evolutionary
success of cooperators in one population works vice versa for cooperators in the other
population(s) too. Due to this symmetry, it is easy to understand that, as we have
shown, the larger the number of populations forming the system, the more effective the
promotion of cooperation.
We have also shown that the already mentioned positive impact can be
enhanced further if we allow different temptations to defect in different populations.
Counterintuitively, in a system where the population specific temptation to defect values
are diverse enough, defectors die out first whose temptation value is the largest. And
this turns out to be detrimental for defectors in other populations too. An extreme
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aggressive invasion namely leads to the fast depletion of the prey – in this case the
cooperators from the corresponding population – which in turn leads to the extinction
of the predators. However, the reverse situation is not valid: if the most vulnerable
cooperators somehow manage to survive, they eventually rise to complete dominance,
using defectors from other populations as Trojan horses to invade cooperators from other
populations. This gives rise to the dominance of the weakest due to the greediness of
the strongest, and it also reminds us that dynamical processes in different populations
should not be too diverse because this jeopardizes the stability of the whole system.
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